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Abstract: China is changing the global metabolism of goods and resources. In the last few 
decades, China has launched an unprecedented and unparalleled economic engagement with 
Africa. The level of Chinese investment on the continent is still very low relative to its 
investment in other regions whereas, for many African countries, China has already become the 
leading trading partner in terms of both import and export business. In fact, China has surpassed 
the U.S.A. as the single largest trading partner of Africa in 2009. One key area of debate in this 
evolving relationship has been the growing environmental footprint of the partnership. Unlike in 
the past, environmental issues have now taken center stage in world politics mainly due to the 
increasingly daunting challenges nations are confronted with in terms of environmental and 
climate change crises. It has taken China quite some time to realize that environmental protection 
is a matter of survival and not a luxury. Hence, the Government of China has been issuing rules, 
regulations, and guidelines to encourage more sustainable economic development. Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) has been vigorously introduced to the business sector since the mid-
2000s in an attempt to achieve this objective. The outcome of this policy direction has been 
positive in that many businesses have been forced to adhere to the strict guidelines; it also reflects 
burgeoning social activism against pollution and environmental destruction at home. This has, 
however, had its downside because companies started to expand to regions with poor governance 
and weak environmental regulations, notably Africa. There is already some evidence that Chinese 
investment in Africa, if not regulated properly, would repeat the history of pollution in China. 
This article argues that the limited success that CSR has registered in China could be repeated in 
Africa only when African states start to engage strategically with rising powers like China. 
African governments need to strictly enforce environmental policy and empower non-state actors, 
particularly civil society organizations (CSOs), to actively monitor developments and safeguard 
the environment. 
 
 
 
Introduction  
In the current decade, there is a growing body of literature arguing against the longstanding 
assumption that Africa’s agency has been too weak to impact on the choice and decision that the 
continent needs to take regarding its development. In line with this, Brown and Harman (2013: 1) 
posit that “in the second decade of the 21st century, when African actors established a sustained 
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track record of assertive, high-level diplomacy and during which the continent has seen long-term 
economic growth, the [weak African agency] approach has started to look ever more 
anachronistic.” The central tenet of this argument is that African engagements with external 
powers have become increasingly more balanced rather than being dominated by the latter so 
structural constraints do not eclipse agency altogether. Some processes cited as evidence are the 
growing assertiveness of developing countries (including Africa) in the UN reform discussions, 
the global climate change negotiations (Zondi, 2013), and the global trade negotiations under the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Lee, 2013). Shaw (2013) emphasizes that evolving African 
agency is showcased by “new regionalisms” involving non-state actors like the Nile Basin 
Initiative; “new multilateralisms” in the areas of conflict diamonds, landmines, fisheries, trade in 
small arms; and the emergence of “innovative sources of finance” including global solidarity 
fund, climate change fund, remittance taxes, and of course, emerging donors prominently China. 
Another innovative aspect of finance mobilization worth mentioning is the construction of the 
Renaissance Dam by Ethiopia, the largest in Africa, with 100 % of its $4.5 billion contribution 
coming from domestic sources, involving no external development support. As a development 
practitioner who served as an advisor in a bilateral development agency in Ethiopia, I have had 
the opportunity to witness that the level of assertiveness by the government has been unusually 
high.  
There is a growing receptivity to CSR processes by Chinese businesses. China currently 
being a leading trading partner to Africa, this positive trend in CSR receptivity will have 
implications in greening the China-Africa relations. This article looks at the state of CSR 
evolution in Chinese overseas businesses as it specifically applies to Africa-bound investments; it 
tries to gather some evidence on harmful practices of Chinese investments in Africa; and it 
analyzes whether there has been any role played by African agency in minimizing negative 
impacts. I draw exclusively on a desk review of the available literature on the environmental 
footprint of China in Africa, and the ongoing debate on whether CSR initiatives have been 
effective in ameliorating environmental impacts of expatriate businesses in Africa. Owing to the 
fact that there is limited published information available on this topic, my review points to the 
need for systematic empirical research that involves Chinese investment in various parts of Africa 
in order to get a clearer and more precise picture of what is really happening in terms of both 
environmental impacts and the role of African agency in the process. 
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China’s Economic Development: The Environmental Externalities 
China’s consistent economic growth of 8 to 12% over the last two decades (Mol, 2011; Simons, 
2013), which brought millions of people out of poverty, has come at a great environmental cost 
both domestically and globally (Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013; Zadek et al., 2012). Turner and 
Ellis (2007) illustrate that its economic success has cost it dearly with ecological destruction 
characterized by smoggy cities, black rivers, pervading deserts, and degraded coastal waters, 
causing a serious threat to China’s economy, public health and social stability. Examples abound. 
According to Turner and Ellis, sixteen of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are found in China 
due to air pollution from cars and coal and Linfen, a major coal-mining city in Shanxi Province, 
is the most polluted in the world. Air pollution causes as many as 400,000 premature deaths and 
75 million asthma attacks every year. Sulfur dioxide induced acid rain is not only affecting two-
thirds of the country and may be reducing crop yields by as much as 30 %, but also nearly 50 % 
of it in Korea and Japan is traceable to China. Industrial dumping of untreated wastewater into 
rivers is rarely abated and municipal wastewater treatment rates are appallingly low, at 30 % 
nationwide. Thus, unchecked emissions have left half of China’s rivers so polluted that their 
water cannot be used by either industry or agriculture. Moreover, 25 % of the Chinese 
population, mainly in the rural areas, is drinking unclean water.  
   Chen et al (2013) conclude in a recent study that China’s explosive economic growth has 
led to relatively anemic growth in life expectancy. As such, air pollution from coal use has 
reduced life expectancy by about 5.5 years in northern China due to an increased incidence of 
cardiorespiratory mortality. An official of the Beijing City Municipality has recently stated that 
China will need to spend nearly US$817 billion to fight air pollution (Yongqiang, 2013). 
The global metabolism is changing due to the ascent of China (Simons, 2013: 20). Its fast 
economic growth and rising middle class have also made China one of the top consumers of 
resources such as oil, copper, aluminum and iron ore, tropical wood, and agricultural raw 
materials; thus raising the global environmental footprint of China (Mol, 2011). As the impact of 
this growth is being dramatically felt all over the world, the hitherto peripheral economies of the 
sub-Saharan Africa also share some of the costs as it happened during the ascent of earlier 
economic powers such as the Dutch Republic, the British Empire, Japan, and the United States. 
What makes the ascendance of the emerging economies like China different is the fact that 
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today’s environmental degradation is too big a global concern to ignore compared to past 
centuries.  
China’s “going out” has been driven by a mixture of economic, political and 
environmental factors. First and foremost there is the shortage of domestic commodities and 
global oil price spikes (Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013). Urban et al. (2013) concur that China’s 
rapid economic growth and population growth have depleted domestic resources and raised the 
resource exigency. Moreover, saturation of the Chinese market in some sectors and rapid 
technological progress at home have driven the expansion of companies overseas. In this regard, 
Mol (2011) suggests that institutional support by the government is a major driving force. Shinn 
and Eisenman (2012) add a couple of political factors driving the expansion overseas: developing 
good relations with other countries so that China can count on their support in regional and 
international forums; and promoting the “One China” Policy through curtailing Taiwan’s official 
diplomatic ties and replacing them with recognition for Beijing. 
 
The Environmental Footprint of China in Africa 
China’s economic engagement with Africa has shown dramatic progress in the past three decades 
with the total trade volume growing from about US$1 billion in 1990 to $200 billion in 2012 
(Figure 1). As a result, China surpassed the U.S.A. as the single largest trading partner for Africa 
in 2009 (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012).  
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Figure 1: China-Africa Trade Volume 2000-2012 /unit US$ 100 million (Xinhuanet. 2013a) 
 
 
China’s interest in Africa shifted gradually from political and ideological to largely economic 
with a special focus on the extraction of natural resources, the relative import of which is still 
small, but increasing rapidly with clear concentration on energy, minerals, metals and agricultural 
raw materials (Mol, 2011; Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013). Extractives (Table 1) have been the 
main focus of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to Africa over the past decade, 
resulting in a negative balance of trade for those countries with fewer natural resources (Thomas, 
2013).  
 
Table 1: China’s trade with Africa: Raw materials  
Country Raw material 
Angola Oil 
Sudan Oil 
Congo Brazzaville Oil, Timber, Base Metals 
Equatorial Guinea Oil, Timber 
Gabon Timber, Iron Ore, and Manganese 
Zambia Copper and Base Metals 
WhitePaper 
 
4 
 
As the volume of China- frica trade continues to grow, its proportion to China's and Africa's respec-
tive total foreign trade volume has also increased. From 2000 to 2012, the proportion of China-Africa 
trade volume as a part of China's total foreign trade volume increased from 2.23% to 5.13%: the 
proportion consisting of China's imports from Africa up from 2.47% to 6.23%, and that of China's 
exports to Africa from 2.02% to 4.16%. On the African side, the changes are even more remarkable. 
From 2000 to 2012, the proportion of China-Africa trade volume as a part of Africa's total foreign 
trade volume increased from 3.82% to 16.13%: the proportion contributed by Africa's exports to 
China up from 3.76% to 18.07%, and that by Africa's imports from China from 3.88% to 14.11%. 
 
Chinese products exported to Africa are generally of fine quality and well-priced, and fulfill the con-
sumption demands of all social strata in Africa. With the scale of trade expanded, the structure of 
China-Africa trade has been improved step by step. As the consumption capacity of the African mar-
ket continues to expand, the amount of technical products that China exports to Africa has increased 
remarkably. In 2012, the proportion of mechanical and electrical products as a part of China's total 
commodity exports to Africa reached 45.9%. In order to guarantee the quality of products exported 
to Africa, from December 2010 to March 2011, the Chinese side took special steps to crack down on 
the potential export to Africa of counterfeit and shoddy products and commodities that violated in-
tellectual property rights. This involved multiple measures, such as prior-to-shipment quality exami-
nations for industrial products that were to be exported to Africa. These measures helped guarantee 
the quality of Chinese commodities exported to Africa. 
 
Over the p st thre  years, China's import volume from Africa has increased notably, as the trade 
volume and quantity of bulk commodities, like crude oil and agricultural products, keep rising. 
Through China-Africa trade, Africa's exporters have obtained access to a stable market, higher pric-
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Nigeria Oil 
South Africa Iron Ore, Diamonds, Base Metals, Platinum, Manganese Copper, and 
Aluminum 
Ghana Manganese 
Namibia Copper 
DR Congo Raw Materials (miscellaneous) 
Cameroon Timber 
Source: Thomas (2013) 
 
Now there is a growing awareness and concern regarding some of the negative implications of 
Chinese investments in Africa. Accordingly public and private reactions are mounting, with some 
governments becoming more assertive in their interactions with China. In some countries, 
Chinese companies have been forced to stop operations due to economic and environmental 
disputes (Mol, 2011).  
Concerns revolve around illegal and/or unsustainable resource extraction, lack of 
transparency and labor disputes. Peh and Eyal (2010) suggest that new environmental problems 
could emanate for two reasons. Firstly, Chinese companies have already set a bad precedent at 
home, and hence the legal restrictions placed on their overseas operations are likely to be even 
looser. Secondly, China might be tempted to “export” pollution to other continents as a result of 
the growing concern for the environment and mounting public uproar on polluting companies at 
home.  
The environmental footprint of China in Africa touches upon various sectors. For 
example, Alden (2012) citing Kelley (2009) states that the unwillingness of Chinese mining 
companies based in Katanga Province of DR Congo to incorporate basic health and safety 
regulations, local labor laws and even industry environmental standards received harsh criticism. 
The following sectoral cases illustrate the emerging environmental dynamics in China-Africa 
relations: 
 
Forestry: Simons (2013) explains why China, which was self-sufficient in lumber until the 
1990s, eventually engaged in imports from other countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa. This was 
due to the heavy summer rains in 1998 that flooded the Yangtze River basin, killing thousands of 
Negusu Aklilu  JCIR: VOL. 2, No. 1 (2014) 
32 
 
people and destroying enormous amounts of resources, which alerted Chinese leaders to the 
impacts of deforestation and soil erosion, and prompted them to take measures to ban local 
logging in most of the nation. As a result, for instance, 90% of log exports from Mozambique and 
70% from Gabon and Cameroon are destined for China. While timber from Africa makes up only 
less than 5% of the Chinese imports, the forest degradation is quite alarming with more than half 
of global losses of forest cover between 2000 and 2005 happening on the continent (Asche and 
Schüller, 2008). More importantly, Taylor (2007) establishes that most of the African timber 
heading for China is illegal; i.e., Cameroon (50%), Congo Brazzaville (90%), Equatorial Guinea 
(90%), Gabon (70%), and Liberia (100%).  
 
Mining: An assessment conducted in eleven African countries where there are active mining 
operations underlines that there is still a major gap with regard to how the companies address 
environmental issues associated with their extraction activities while, acknowledging that there is 
growing awareness and interest in CSR and environmental impact mitigation policies by Chinese 
companies operating outside of China (Scott, 2012). It is also further underscored that 
“[o]perations owned by state owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to be better run, more interested in 
and capable of implementing environmental impact mitigation and CSR programs than privately 
owned Chinese mining operations” (Scott, 2012: 4).  
 
Wildlife: China ranks as the number one market for illegal wildlife or wildlife parts (McMurray 
cited in Felbab-Brown, 2011: 1). The wildlife trade monitoring network, TRAFFIC (2012), is 
deeply concerned about the illicit trade in wildlife from Africa to China which is exported as part 
of legitimate shipments of other natural resources, such as timber, more so because only less than 
2% of cargo traffic is inspected before leaving Africa. These resources include ivory, rhino horn, 
abalone, sharks, sea cucumbers and pangolins.  
 
Fishery: A study conducted by Pauly et al. (2013) reveals that Chinese deep-water fishing 
(DWF) is significantly under-reported. The annual average catch from 2000 to 2011 was 
estimated to be about 4.6 million tons, which is 92 % higher than the reported figure. Out of this, 
two-thirds of the catch comes from West Africa, which Pauly et al. (2013) call the “looting of 
Africa”. What is worse, about one-third of the Chinese DWF vessels were reported from West 
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African waters, 75 % of which are bottom trawlers, the most ecologically destructive types of 
fishing vessels. In terms of foreign currency, the loot from West Africa is worth more than US$7 
billion just from the Chinese DWF. It is worth noting, though, that China is the major, but not the 
only culprit in this business. For example, over half of all IUU fishing vessels observed fishing 
illegally in Guinean waters were Chinese.  
 
Oil: Sinopec’s experience in the Loango National Park of Gabon in 2006 is worth mentioning. 
After having been awarded a block located in the National Park, and upon completion of an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA), Sinopec started seismic exploration activities before the 
Gabonese Ministry of Environment approval was issued. A protest by local conservation groups 
concerned that the exploration activities threatened rare plants and animals led, in September 
2006, to a decision by the Gabonese National Park Service to halt the company’s operation and 
take subsequent measures (Jansson, 2009).  
 
Infrastructure: According to Kaplinsky (2010), many infrastructural projects have been linked to 
resource extraction, and subject to criticism on environmental grounds. Tan-Mullins and Mohan 
(2013) also illustrate the “Angola mode” to show that the environmental situation is potentially 
exacerbated by the Chinese preference for using oil resources as repayment for concessional 
loans. However, Brautigam (2009) argues that the Chinese business design is flexible enough to 
accommodate such repayment methods and only opts for resources when they are the most secure 
means of ensuring a return. Besides, she adds that ‘resource for repayment’ is not the only model 
of concessional lending adopted by China. 
 
Evolution of CSR Policy in China  
Dahlsrud (2008) analyzed 37 definitions of CSR and identified five key dimensions; namely, 
environmental, social, economic, stakeholder and voluntariness. The first environmental 
dimension includes considerations such as: a cleaner environment, environmental stewardship, 
and environmental concerns in business operations. The most frequently used version that comes 
from the Commission of European Communities defines CSR as a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction 
with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. For the purpose of this paper, CSR is treated as 
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analogous to similar terms such as corporate responsibility, business sustainability, and corporate 
citizenship. 
According to WEF (2012), the concept of CSR is relatively new in China, used widely as 
a formal concept only around the year 2000. Some “corporate citizenship” practices predated the 
institutionalization of the concept. But these were somehow abandoned owing to the dominance 
of profit-orientation in companies, to be later re-introduced following catastrophic local problems 
and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. WEF (2012: 10-12) 
suggests that the concept of CSR in China has passed through three stages since then: 
 
i) 2001-2005: Re-Introduction of “CSR” after Joining the WTO  
The re-introduction was driven by growing domestic demands and, more significantly, due to 
substantial influence from foreign companies. As a result, the central government launched the 
Scientific Outlook on Development, which is a “people-centered approach to development” 
(WEF, 2012: 10). This theory was initiated by ex-President Hu Jintao and successively endorsed 
by the Third Plenum of the 16th Central Committee and the Politburo in 2003 (Fewsmith, 2004). 
This has since then inspired some states like Shenzhen and Changzhou to take more action and 
academics, NGOs and other researchers in China to begin paying more attention to the 
citizenship efforts of large companies. There is evidence that the “Scientific Outlook on 
Development” still remains one of the key theoretical guidance tools. In a recent meeting of the 
Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Xi Jinping reconfirmed the 
leadership’s commitment by beseeching members and officials to strengthen studies and practices 
around this theory (Xinhua, 2013b). 
 
ii) 2006-2007: Evolution of the Corporate Citizenship Concept 
This second period is marked by some major shifts, which include the following, among others 
(WEF, 2012: 11): 
 The central government developed regional guidelines and revised the Company Law of 
2006 to require companies to launch social responsibility initiatives.  
 The Communist Party of China urged the enhanced social responsibility of citizens, 
enterprises and other organizations.  
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 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) introduced a set of Guidelines for Social 
Responsibility of Listed Companies. 
 Chinese SOEs started to issue CSR reports, the forerunner being the SOE, State Grid.  
 President Hu Jintao re-emphasized the importance of CSR following his 2007 visit to 
Sweden, after which the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) took the initiative to develop 
social responsibility standards.  
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs donated US$10,000 to the UN Global Compact which led 
to a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese companies joining the initiative. 
 
iii) 2008-Present: Accelerated Development (Stronger Standards) 
A set of domestic and global factors has led to stronger consideration for CSR practices since 
2008 (WEF, 2012). Government decided to close the Fujia Petrochemical Plant located in Dailan 
following public protests against leaking chemicals. The Wenchuan earthquake of 2008 and the 
Beijing Olympics triggered more alarm on the need for stricter regulations. Consequently, the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) introduced a formal 
set of CSR reporting guidelines for central government owned enterprises (CSOEs). Then the 
SZSE and the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) followed suit and, in 2009, both published social 
responsibility indices that aimed to help Chinese investors factor CSR into their investment 
decisions (WEF, 2012). SASAC then required all CSOEs to publish corporate citizenship reports 
by 2012. These measures have ushered in an era of stronger standards with much more awareness 
and active participation of the public through social media outlets.  
 
Is CSR Working in China and beyond? 
There is a mixture of views regarding China’s CSR performance. Some analysts maintain that the 
recent proliferation of CSR regulations and guidelines in China simply represent window-
dressing designed to greenwash vandalizing activities at home and overseas. Other scholars hold 
a more optimistic view that China has evolved to become a more responsible and accountable 
partner, which is demonstrated by the issuance of policy instruments and growing efforts towards 
their implementation.  
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Kolk et al. (2010) argue that there is a difference between domestic Chinese and 
international retailers, the former reporting more on economic conditions including philanthropy 
while the latter focus on product responsibility. Thus, they conclude that labor and environmental 
issues receive relatively little attention. Tang (2012) contests that, unlike in the West, CSR is 
primarily a government-guided activity in China rather than a private sector initiative; and hence 
CSR initiatives are more prominent in SOEs. Therefore, private companies should welcome and 
invite oversight from government, society, customers and other stakeholders, he recommends. 
Noronha et al. (2013) contend that CSR reporting in China is at a very preliminary stage and 
hence there is still substantial room for improvement through the concerted efforts of 
government, enterprises and researchers. Lin (2010) underscores the historical foundations and 
many real incentives for Chinese companies to introduce CSR, and equally stresses the numerous 
political, social and economic constraints that hinder CSR from developing at a quicker pace.  
Finally, Mol (2011) optimistically argues that China is not yet one of the leaders in 
sustainability, but has increasingly considered environmental protection in its modernization 
program since the mid-2000s, along three strategies instituted in new environmental policies and 
institutions. These are: first, reducing the natural resource, energy and carbon intensity of 
economic processes via increased efficiency; second, shifting to renewable resources that are 
more sustainable and less polluting; and third, recycling and re-using materials through the 
adoption of the circular economy concept. Sustainability measures are being seriously introduced 
into both domestic and overseas investments, Mol concludes.  
Overall, there are indications that CSR in China is not just a window-dressing exercise 
anymore, although the process has been protracted so has yet to take full effect. Zadek et al. 
(2012) posit that there are clear indications that CSR in China is moving fast from the compliance 
stage to strategic stage (endeavoring to gain competitive advantage by incorporating societal 
issues into business strategies) and onto the civil stage, where broad industry action is aligned to 
national sustainable development priorities. Even then, environmental issues have a better chance 
than human rights (Lin, 2010). Kuo et al. (2012: 284) concur that environmentally sensitive 
investments (ESIs) and SOEs pay more attention to disclosure of environmental protection 
issues, particularly in the areas of energy saving and carbon emission reduction. 
When it comes to overseas investments, Tan-Mullins and Mohan (2013) argue that the 
outcomes of the CSR strategy in environmental protection vary widely due to the operating 
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procedures of the Chinese SOEs in combination with specific local political and economic 
structures. They further underline that in the presence of active advocacy groups empowered by 
local legislation, there is a propensity towards better CSR implementation. 
A report compiled by the World Economic Forum (WEF) assessing Chinese overseas 
investments establishes that some Chinese companies, including SOEs, have made significant 
progress towards corporate citizenship, boosting local markets, creating jobs, launching 
environmental initiatives and helping to foster a new breed of social entrepreneurs. It also 
documented the best practices of 75 Chinese overseas companies, and noted that the participation 
of Chinese companies in the UN Global Compact is on the rise. And it noted that an increasing 
number of Chinese companies are publishing corporate citizenship-related reports based on 
sophisticated global standards such as the Global Reporting Initiative (WEF, 2012). On a similar 
note, Zadek et al. (2012) concur that CSR is already a mainstream concern in China and that the 
number of Chinese companies producing CSR reports is increasing. Along this line, 
policymakers are advancing policy measures in support of CSR, business leaders have developed 
positive attitudes toward CSR, capital markets have issued CSR guidelines and, most important 
of all, consumers are responding to CSR practices by changing purchasing practices. In a 
nutshell, the authors underscore that there is a rapid evolution from considering CSR as a foreign 
requirement and barrier to trade and investment towards embracing it as a key tool to augment 
competitive advantage and international standards, more so because it is increasingly perceived 
as a state-supported expectation for doing business.  
 So the China story in Africa is not altogether gloomy when it comes to CSR issues. There 
have been some positive stories, all earned through some effort, which may help in formulating 
future engagement strategies with Chinese investments. Gu (2009) posits that China’s dramatic 
economic growth came with high environmental costs because CSR practices had received little 
interest and Chinese businesses in Africa were launched from this bad precedent. The growing 
interest in enforcing CSR by the Chinese government, however, has pushed some local 
companies out of business, which has resulted in the relocation of such businesses to other 
regions, including Africa, where regulatory measures are less stringent and barely enforced. 
Cases in point are the fisheries and forestry sectors. The introduction of new regulations due to 
the depletion of Chinese fishery resources prompted local fishers to move to aquaculture and 
distance water fishing. Similarly more stringent restrictions on domestic logging, again due to 
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resource depletion, led to increased imports from overseas (Power et al., 2012). Both these policy 
changes have environmental implications for Africa because China has become a leading trading 
partner to some of its countries. 
 However, this does not mean that all businesses from China are bad apples. The march of 
Chinese companies into Africa followed a process, which Gu (2011) calls the “Three Jumps”. 
Businesses in China first started exporting to Africa; then they started investing in production in 
Africa; and consequently they started to set up industrial parks (special economic zones). 
Whereas businesses are rushing into Africa, CSR performance is still trailing, one can conclude.  
 
African Agency at Play and the Eminent Challenges  
Scholars have documented the unsustainable practices of Chinese investments in a few countries. 
Equally importantly, in some countries, such unsustainable corporate behavior was received with 
a coordinated response and, sometimes, assertive action by various actors; these have proven to 
be instrumental in improving the behavior of these companies. The following are a few examples 
of these success stories: 
 
i) Ghana: Multi-stakeholder consultation contributed to a good outcome (Hensengerth and 
Scheumann, 2011) 
A multi-stakeholder consultation process has proven to be effective in minimizing social and 
environmental impacts in Ghana. The Chinese company, Sinohydro, was involved in the 
construction of the Bui hydropower dam in Ghana, a project that had immense social and 
environmental impacts. The Bui Power Authority, which was responsible for the planning and 
resettlement of local communities, had not complied with the recommendations of the 
Resettlement Planning Framework, particularly pertaining to proper consultation processes. 
Having prioritized speed in the construction of the dam, the authority rather deliberately avoided 
negotiations and opted for the hurried resettlement of the communities. The Ghana Dams 
Dialogue, a cross-stakeholder platform, was then initiated to addresses the lack of public 
consultation whereby representatives of affected people, government and NGOs took part. The 
civil society pressure from this process is believed to have contributed a great deal in improving 
the resettlement plan drawing on experience from failures in Ghana’s biggest dam, Akosombo, 
that was constructed in the early 1960s.  
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ii) Gabon: Civil society activism paid back (Jansson 2009; Mol 2011) 
Sinopec, one of the three major Chinese SOE oil companies, was awarded a block located in the 
Loango National Park, Gabon in 2006. The company then undertook an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) and proceeded to seismic exploration activities before the EIA got approval 
from the Gabonese Ministry of the Environment. This led to an uproar by conservation groups, 
which consequently led to the suspension of the company’s operations. Jansson (2009) concludes 
that this process was crucial because the company was forced to revise its EIA in collaboration 
with the WWF and EnviroPass, a local Gabonese organization. Sinopec was only permitted to 
resume its activities after producing a better quality EIA document. Mol (2011) documented that, 
in 2010, Brainforest, a national environmental NGO in Gabon, successfully campaigned against 
the environmental impacts of the massive Belinga iron-ore development project combined with 
hydropower dam that is supported by the Exim Bank of China. Gabon has since then been 
delisted from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) for its poor reporting 
performance. Sinopec’s Addax Petroleum is in a legal dispute with the Gabonese Government 
after it was accused in May 2013 for failing to pay customs duties and comply with other laws, 
which could result in Addax losing its license (Farge, 2013). 
 
iii) Tanzania and Kenya: Government assertiveness stirred positive reaction from China 
(Kapama, 2013) 
The Government of Tanzania impeached three Chinese nationals in early November 2013 for the 
unlawful possession of 706 pieces of elephant tusks that represented the slaughter of about 400 
elephants and with a value of over US$ 3 million (Kapama, 2013). The Chinese Embassy in 
Tanzania then reacted by requesting its citizens in Tanzania to strictly abide by Chinese and 
Tanzanian laws, and refrain from ivory or other smuggling. The statement from the Chinese 
Embassy also reconfirmed China’s commitment to the protection of wildlife, through allegiance 
to the CITES Convention (Peoples Republic of China, 2013). There are other evidences 
indicating that China is responding positively to the concerns of illegal wildlife trade in Africa. In 
a landmark event, China helped arrest a Chinese man suspected of wildlife smuggling in response 
to allegations by the Kenyan government (Burgess, 2014). Furthermore, the China Endangered 
Species Import and Export Management Office seized tons of illegal wildlife products mainly 
including rhino horns and elephant ivory, and arrested over 400 suspects in January 2014 
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(Xinhua, 2014). In the same month, for the first time ever, China publicly destroyed over six tons 
of confiscated ivory in the Guangdong Province, which is a major hub of ivory trade in China 
(New York Times, 2014 cited by Lawson and Vines, 2014). The authors, however, argue that this 
number constitutes a small portion of the total volume of ivory confiscated between 2009 and 
2013, which is estimated at 45 tons.  
 
iv) Sudan: At times, some corporations are generous  
In Sudan, the Chinese oil company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), supported 
some CSR activities like construction of schools, hospitals and setting up the world’s largest 
biodegradable wastewater treatment facility in some oil fields to eliminate discharge of effluents 
(CAITEC 2010 cited in Power et al., 2012). 
 
v) Zambia: Strong government reaction prompted positive response (Mol, 2011) 
In 2006, the Government of Zambia shut down a coalmine run by Collum Coal Mine Industries 
of China for its sub-standard working conditions and failing to implement environmental and 
safety regulations. Also, in May 2007, the Zambian government closed Chiman Manufacturing 
Plant, a manganese mine in Kabwe run by a Chinese trans-national corporation (TNC), as a 
response to local concerns over high levels of air pollution and failures to implement pollution 
control measures (Mol, 2011). Against this backdrop, Mol (2011) argues that these daunting 
environmental challenges have prompted Chinese state agencies, financial institutions and the 
larger state-owned and private companies to introduce voluntary and self-regulatory CSR 
measures. Apart from such policy instruments, an initiative to incentivize model enterprises was 
launched for Chinese TNCs operating in Africa, such as the 2010 Green Banking Innovation 
Awards and the 2010 Top Chinese Enterprises in Africa Award. 
 
Challenges abound, though, in both China and investment destinations in Africa when it comes to 
environmental issues. Tan-Mullins and Mohan (2013) posit that China’s CSR initiatives fall short 
in the implementation and enforcement of policies, mainly owing to the decentralized system of 
governance in China that eventually devolves authority to local governments. To make matters 
worse, the performance of local governments is assessed through economic targets, which 
undermines and de-prioritizes CSR initiatives. 
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Compagnon and Alejandro (2013) suggest that the matter becomes more complex 
because there are at least five categories of actors from China with varying levels of CSR 
performance: SOEs closely controlled by the Chinese Communist Party; private Chinese 
investment banks with government connections; PRC sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) such as the 
China-Africa Development Fund; medium-sized enterprises owned by Chinese local government 
structures; and small, private companies and individuals. They then argue that the debate usually 
fails to make any distinction between the types of actor involved, who exhibit varying levels of 
performance in Africa. Regardless of the policy instruments in place, the Chinese government is 
incapable of controlling the last two categories. Tang (2012) agrees that there is an imbalance 
between SOEs and private companies in the conduct of CSR. Mallory (2013) holds that, today, 
70 % of the Chinese DWF industry is small and medium-sized private companies, as opposed to 
25 years ago when the industry was exclusively state-owned, a dynamic that has made the rules 
less stringent. And Kapama (2013) stresses that there is also the issue of individual Chinese 
migrants who get involved in illicit activities. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
China’s environmental footprint in Africa is growing largely due to the environmentally sensitive 
nature of its trade and aid projects, which include infrastructure and public works, oil and gas, 
and mining (Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013). The current body of literature suggests that there is 
a growing appreciation of the challenges and the urgent need to rectify them, a process that needs 
to take into account the following key lessons for both Chinese and African actors and interests: 
 Not all Chinese companies are SOEs, and there is discrepancy in CSR performance among 
the different types of businesses (Tang, 2012; Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013). 
 The government of China does not currently have full control of all types of investments 
reaching Africa and lacks a proper coordination mechanism. Particularly, private companies, 
SMEs and individual Chinese immigrants must be viewed very carefully because they have 
demonstrated poor CSR performance and weak public accountability (Peh and Eyal, 2010; 
Mol, 2011; Mallory, 2013; Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013). 
 Regional SOEs show a tendency to falsify and exaggerate information because there is 
always the temptation to want to be regarded as economically successful, which oftentimes 
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happens through deliberate understatement of externalities including environmental costs 
(Peh and Eyal, 2010; Mallory, 2013). 
 Unlike in the West, civil society activism in China is exclusively focused on domestic issues 
and may not be counted on as a reliable advocacy tool to monitor and bring into account 
companies investing overseas. Creating an enabling environment for vibrant civil society in 
Africa, though, if positively employed, can reduce impacts and enlarge the gains for Africa 
(Alden and Alves, 2009; Jansson, 2009; Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013).  
 The loose environmental policy of African governments is a major impediment in 
implementing CSR instruments by Chinese companies. There is, therefore, an urgent need to 
ensure the enforcement of national policy even when tensions arise among local actors driven 
by different, but not necessarily conflicting objectives (Alden and Alves, 2009; Jansson, 
2009; Hensengerth, 2013; Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013; Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013). 
In line with this, African governments need to pay greater attention to local civil society 
voices, and encourage the creation of platforms to deliberate on these issues.  
 African countries need to be aware that they have stronger bargaining power if they stand 
united; they need to be more assertive in speaking against environmental destruction by 
foreign companies (Tan-Mullins and Mohan, 2013; Vickers, 2013). 
 Unilateral measures in enforcing CSR programs might be risky in terms of prompting 
disinvestment by companies (Cornelissen, 2013), which reinforces the need for concerted 
action by African states. 
 
The current literature also attests that there is room for more African agency in the 
implementation of CSR programs of Chinese businesses. However, the lack of relevant policies 
and their implementation presents a tremendous challenge for most African countries. China’s 
CSR policies provide that all Chinese companies should strictly abide by the local laws, which 
also reflects well in the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Mol, 2011; Compagnon 
and Alejandro, 2013). However, most African states neither strictly enforce environmental policy 
nor do they have a vibrant civil society that can advocate against environmental misdeeds. Worse 
still, “China has an Africa policy.... [while] Africa doesn’t have a China policy” (Vickers, 2013: 
673). 
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In order for CSR policies of Chinese overseas companies to be properly implemented and 
environmental impacts minimized, the principal responsibility lies in African state and non-state 
actors. The CSR performance of Chinese companies in Africa is a function of the governance, 
policy and institutional circumstances of the destination economy (Hensengerth, 2013; Tan-
Mullins and Mohan, 2013). Cornelissen (2013: 125) argues that African states also need to 
productively participate in intergovernmental CSR processes, which include, among others, more 
strategic engagement with transnational corporations so that the latter could incorporate CSR 
programs into their investment plans; encouraging regional economic communities to seriously 
consider and harmonize regulations in Africa around CSR; and actively promoting the CSR 
discourse in the bilateral and multilateral talks with emerging partners. 
 
Some sporadic successes registered owing to active African agency notwithstanding, there 
remains an urgent need to address at least three currently outstanding challenges: illegal fishing, 
illegal timber and illegal wildlife trade, all of which are costing Africans a lot of money and 
resources. The bottom line is that African agents could still play greater and better roles by 
strengthening national policies and institutions; coordinating policies and actions collectively at 
regional and continental levels; and by using the FOCAC platform to deliberate on issues and 
seek solutions. “Africa must set terms of China’s engagement”1 as Raila Odinga, the former 
Prime Minister of Kenya rightly stated. 
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